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Introduction 
 It’s a testament to the power of ideas in politics that the ongoing policy disaster in 
Europe is still referred to, by academic as well as popular commentators, as the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis. That there was a crisis in European sovereign debt markets in 2010 
through the middle of 2012 is not in doubt. That is was a crisis of European sovereign debt 
markets generated by ‘too much spending’ should be very much in doubt. The ongoing 
European economic crisis is in fact a transmuted private sector banking crisis first 
exacerbated and then calmed by central bank policy, the costs of which have been 
asymmetrically distributed across European mass publics.  
 Despite the prognostications of senior European policy figures, many academics, 
and even more journalists, there was actually no orgy of government spending in Europe 
that suddenly came due in 2010 and that was met with yield spikes from bond market 
vigilantes. This is little more than a politically inspired myth to cover up the fact of reckless 
over-lending by core European banks whose balance sheets are multiples of their 
sovereign’s GDP, sovereigns that lack the capacity to bail out those self-same banks. What 
happened instead was that the funding crisis of highly levered financial institutions that 
began in the US in 2007 finally hit Europe in middle of 2009 when the European Central 
Bank (ECB) signaled to the markets that it would not act as the lender of last resort for the 
European banking system.  
Unsurprisingly, yields on government bonds became more volatile and began to 
creep up, accelerating in 2010 and 2011 as the market re-priced the risk of sovereigns with 
no printing presses that suddenly found themselves facing too big to bail banking systems 
just as liquidity in the banking system began to dry up. After two years of stuttering policy 
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responses and over twenty summits where the Germans and the ECB played ‘pass the hot 
potato,’ the ECB finally began a program of quantitative easing under the guise of the Long 
Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) and Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
programs that finally reduced bond yields, quite apart from, and despite the now much 
larger debt loads of the affected sovereigns. Meanwhile, having cast these events as a story 
of profligate sovereigns that needed to be disciplined, the policy response of governments, 
budgetary austerity and more fiscal rules, continues to make the situation worse as debt 
loads increase rather than decrease the more public spending is cut. Why then continue to 
spin this as being a public sector debacle rather than a private sector crisis? Three reasons 
stand out.  
The first is ideology. Given the neoliberal and ordoliberal ideas that underpinned 
the major institutions of European governance, ideas that saw sovereigns as the objects in 
need of strict control while the private sector needed no such restraints, it was almost 
impossible for policymakers to admit to this as being a private sector crisis without calling 
into question the entire economic architecture constructed over the past 20 years, which 
would rather obviously leave the architects of this order in malodor.  
The second is self-interest. Once it became apparent that policymakers faced a 
continent-wide banking crisis with completely inadequate national level resolution 
mechanisms – around early 2011 - the only policy response that remained plausible, despite 
it being the wrong diagnosis, was ‘squeeze, add liquidity and pray,’ while playing an 
indefinite game of ‘extend and pretend’ with the balance sheets of major European banks.   
Third, by bailing out the banks in this way, by pumping central bank cash around 
the system to stop a liquidity problem becoming a solvency problem by de facto sterilizing 
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government debt, a bank run around the bond markets and commercial banking sectors of 
Europe was avoided. But the price of doing so was, as correctly foreseen by the ECB back 
in 2009, as more even debt. As the ECB governor Jean Claude Trichet put it in May 2009, 
“the fiscal impact of financial sector support measures will lead to significantly higher 
government debt to GDP ratios,” and indeed it did. 1 The debt generated through this 
process, which is basically a stealth bailout of the assets and the incomes of the top thirty 
percent of the income distribution of these countries and a guarantee for senior and junior 
bondholders of protected financial institutions, has to be paid by someone, but certainly 
not those so affected since they vote and fund elections. Instead it was, and continues to 
be, paid for by the two thirds of the population of these countries that do not have such 
assets, through cuts to government consumption via austerity macroeconomics. In the 
language of finance, this should be called what it is: a class-specific put option.  
To make this case this paper proceeds in three parts. The first section examines the 
claim that what caused the crisis was the overspending of sovereigns and why this was 
politically reconstructed as a sovereign debt crisis. The next section explains this as a crisis 
of (absent) European institutions. It then goes on to detail the necessary conditions of the 
crisis, over-lending and balance-sheet expansion by core European banks based upon a too 
big to fail business model. We then examine how and why budgetary austerity in the public 
sector is a necessary compliment of bailing the private sector before examining, in 
conclusion, what other options are available to Europe to resolve this on-going slow motion 
banking and growth crisis.  
 
                                                        
1 Jean Claude Trichet, “Introductory Comments with Q and A,” European Central Bank, Press Conference, 
May 7th 2009. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2009/html/is090507.en.html  
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Too Much Debt Caused the Crisis? 
 What is perhaps the canonical statement of how excessive government spending 
caused the Euro crisis was given German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble in the 
Financial Times on the 5th of September 2011 when he asserted that “it is an undisputable 
fact that excessive state spending has led to unsustainable levels of debt and deficits that 
now threaten our economic welfare. Piling on more debt now will stunt rather than 
stimulate growth in the long run. Governments in and beyond the Eurozone need not just 
to commit to fiscal consolidation and improved competitiveness – they need to start 
delivering on these now.”2  
 The causality in this claim is important. Excessive state spending has led to 
unsustainable debts and deficits, not as Trichet had it two years previously, that the bailing 
out of banking systems would cause excessive debts. If Schäuble is correct however, we 
should be able to see two things in the data. First, a long and sustained rise in expenditure 
above growth levels and/or the rise of structural deficits. Second, an increase in government 
debts in the run up to the crisis and a subsequent fall in debts as austerity kicked in around 
2010. The curious thing is that this really is not what we see in the data at all. Figure one 
shows Euro area average gross debt to GDP through 2013.  
 
 
                                                        
2 Wolfgang Schaüble, “Why Austerity is the Only Cure for the Eurozone,” Financial Times, September 5th 
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/97b826e2-d7ab-11e0-a06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nHuKIbsB  
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This first oddity is that debts seemed to have been going down, not up, on average, just 
prior to the crisis of 2008, with the rise in debts from 2008-2009 merely bringing them 
back up to the prior five year moving average of around 70 percent debt to GDP. The spike 
in debt begins and accelerates after 2010 when serious bank bailouts began and economies 
fell into policy induced recessions. In sum, debts increased when the Eurozone began to 
cut its budgets, not before, which seems to suggest that cutting government consumption 
leads to more, not less, debt. 
 A more fine-grained analysis makes Schäuble’s claim odder still. The much 
commented upon case of Greece surely conforms to picture offered by Schäuble. After all, 
everyone knows that they clearly overspent, right? Actually, not quite. Although Greek 
debt to GDP was higher than the eurozone average, it had hovered at around 100 percent 
of GDP since 1994, with a low of 94 percent in 2000 and a high of 105.4 percent in 2008; 
there was no giant leap in the 2000s.3 On a five year moving average prior to 2008 it’s 
stable. So if there was overspending it must be through a structural deficit where taxes are 
insufficient to meet expenditures. Indeed, Greece has such a structural deficit, but the size 
of the overall budget deficit varied, with it decreasing through the 1990s to a low of -3.2 
                                                        
3  All figures in this section come from the Trading Economics database, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/. Averages are author’s calculations. 
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percent in 1999 doubling to -6.5 percent in 2007 at the eve of the crisis. Yet if the markets 
were worried about these deficits, either structural or cyclical, it simply didn’t show up in 
the Greek bond yields, whose spread to German bunds stayed flat and absurdly close 
throughout this period.  
Moreover, any structural deficit has to be seen in relation to two other variables: 
the GDP growth rate and the rate of change in public spending. The former averaged around 
3.3 percent in the seven years up to the crisis while the latter increased at around 4 percent 
per annum, which together with low interest rates on government borrowing hardly signals 
an orgy of government expenditures, even in the supposedly worst offender of Greece, just 
a larger than average deficit. Greece of course was also accused of padding the public 
payroll to absurd levels. Yet in actual fact Greece appears in the middle of the distribution 
of OECD countries public employment as a percentage of GDP in 2009 with the very 
efficient Scandinavians, and even the UK employing a much higher percentage of their 
population via the public purse in central government.4 
 Similar patterns can be found in other supposedly offending countries. Spanish 
government expenditures certainly went up during the 2000s, more than doubling over a 
ten year period. But that was from a very low level in comparison to the European average, 
and at the same time Spanish debt to GDP fell from 59.3 percent in 2001 to a low of 36.1 
in 2008. So Spain spent more while paying back its debt on the back of a GDP CAGR for 
the decade of just under four percent. Again, this hardly evidences an orgy of spending.  
Ireland shows the same pattern, with debts falling from a high 48.5 in 2001 to a low 
of 24.8 in 2007 while expenditures increased by about 40 percent, which is high, but it 
                                                        
4 OECD, Government at a Glance 2009. V. Public Employment. Employment in General Government and 
Public Corporations. Version 1. Last Updated 14th November 2010. 
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occurred on an average growth rate of around six percent since the mid 1990s. In fact, the 
only major state in the Euro area that has seen a sustained increase in debt to GDP over the 
past decade from 60 percent in 2000 to 80 percent in 2013 plus a smaller but consistently 
increasing rate of government expenditure coupled to low growth has been Germany - and 
Germany is most certainly not in the dock for profligacy.  
 This is an odd picture to say the least, and it raises some questions of greater 
concern than European policymakers’ understandings of causality. Government debts in 
Spain and Ireland fell dramatically before the crisis and in Greece they stayed more or less 
flat. Spending went up, but from low levels, on the back of higher than average growth 
rates. There were in some cases structural deficits, but the markets never seemed to price 
them in. Given this, how could excessive spending that didn’t actually happen end up 
producing a sovereign debt crisis? The answer is, it didn’t. So what did?  
To answer this we need to stop looking at sovereigns and start looking at banks. 
But to get there we have to remember how and why this crisis was politically constructed 
as a crisis of excessive spending in order to understand why banks are the critical factor 
behind the crisis - and why that fact must be denied at all costs by Europe’s political elites. 
There is a simple distributionary politics story at the heart of all of this that remains oddly 
invisible that is the pan-European class-specific put option. To get us there we start with 
the official story of the European crisis and then switch gears to examine why European 
politicians shy away from telling us the real story of the crisis, which is all about quietly 
resolving a banking crisis bigger than the states supposed to resolve it.  
 
Welcome to the Over-Lending Crisis 
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In August 2007 IKB, a Dusseldorf-based lender, had to be rescued after suffering 
losses on its U.S. subprime investments. Following this it seemed, for a while, that all was 
quiet on the European front until the rescue of Hypo Real Estate bank in 2008. Such minor 
rumbles apart, Europe seemed to have none of the convulsions of the UK and USA with 
systemically important firms such as Northern Rock and Lehman going to the wall. By late 
2008 Europe thought it had survived the worst of the meltdown in ‘Anglo-Saxon banking’ 
that, as then German Finance minister Peer Steinbrück put it, was (correctly) seen as the 
cause of the crisis. As he put it, the “irresponsible overemphasis on the ‘laissez-faire’ 
principle, namely giving market forces the most possible freedom from state regulation, in 
the Anglo-American financial system,” which had led to a crisis of overlending.5 The 
European banking model, in contrast, was said to be much more sound due to its more 
conservative funding and lending practices, so there was no need to throw money at the 
problem as the United States and the UK had done. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
put it in late 2008, “cheap money in the US was a driver of this crisis…I am deeply 
concerned…[with]…reinforcing this trend…[and wonder]…whether we could find 
ourselves back in five years facing the same crisis.”6  
Banks and over-lending were then, at this point, correctly seen as the problem: not 
over-spending. Armed with a supposedly better banking system, Europe, especially 
Germany, had no need to worry. Unlike the United States and the UK, there was no need 
to turn the money pumps on to fuel recovery. Little wonder then that the Germans looked 
on in horror, as the United States and the UK seemed to do just that. Indeed, one of the 
                                                        
5 Leon Mangasarian, “U.S. Losing Financial Superpower Status, Germany Says,” Bloomberg, September 
25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahUuZ8Z5rkDA&refer=germany.  
6 Angela Merkel quoted in Abraham Newman, “Flight from Risk: Unified Germany and the Role of beliefs 
in the European Response to the Financial Crisis,” German Politics and Society 28, 2: 158.  
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oddest aspects of the first stage of financial crisis was the sudden embrace of Keynesian 
economics by, apart from the ECB and the German government, almost everyone…but for 
only about twelve months. A large part of the reason for the return to Keynesianism was 
that governing neoliberal ideas stressed the singular importance of inflation control, the 
futility of fiscal policy, the importance of policy credibility, and the efficiency of markets, 
the sum of which pretty much denied such a crisis could ever happen, especially in the 
private sector. Given what was rather obviously occurring in the world, and with the entire 
global payments system at stake, a policy of ‘leave it to the market’ was really not seen as 
a tenable response. Given this “governments quickly came to believe that monetary policy 
was insufficient on its own to help the real economy.”7  
 The results were both immediate and dramatic as countries as diverse as Brazil, 
China, and the United States lined up to stimulate their economies. China led with 13 
percent of GDP. Spain promised 7 percent while the United States committed around 5.5 
percent of GDP. Even Germany stimulated to the tune of just under 3 percent of GDP. As 
Keynes biographer Lord Skidelsky put it in a book celebrating this rediscovery of Keynes 
in 2009, we had witnessed ‘the Return of the Master.’8 The only problem was that by the 
time the Master returned some very important folks had already left the building: the 
Germans, followed by the British and the Canadians. As a consequence the global return 
of Keynes was to last only a year from start to finish. One more question was relevant at 
this juncture however, where was the ECB in all this? 
 
                                                        
7 Henry Farrell and John Quiggin, “Consensus, Dissensus and Economic Ideas; The Rise and Fall of 
Keynesianism During the Crisis,” unpublished manuscript, 2013, p. 24. 
8 Robert Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master (New York: Public Affairs, 2009). 
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Then the ECB Cocked the Gun 
 Unlike the British Treasury and the US Federal Reserve, both of which were 
extremely active in not just bailing, but through their bailouts deleveraging and 
recapitalizing their banking systems, the ECB sat on the sidelines and did very little in the 
initial stages of the crisis, for two reasons. First, there didn’t appear to be much of a 
European banking crisis until 2010, so there was nothing to fix. Having decided that this 
was an Anglo-Saxon problem, all the ECB sought to do was to ensure that credit channels 
in the economy stayed open. And in that regard they didn’t even cut rates aggressively to 
offset the contractionary effects of the credit crunch until March 2009. Second, given that 
its job was by statute to fight an inflation that clearly wasn’t there, there didn’t seem to be 
all that much to do on that front either.  
 But globally markets were seizing up regardless of statutes as credit market inter-
linkages fed the crisis into Europe. Meanwhile, the financial markets finally began to notice 
that the Eurozone lacked most of the traditional mechanisms for resolving banking 
problems. Thanks to the Euro, national central banks no longer had many instruments to 
deal with the crisis, such as the ability to set short-term rates or print money to bail their 
banks. As such, financial markets, as seen in asset volatility and CDS spreads, began to 
worry about the risks that were really embedded in European assets, especially Eurozone 
sovereign bonds. Normally seen as AAA risk weighted and the instrument of choice for 
interbank lending in Repo transactions - and therefore crucial for how banks actually fund 
themselves (which, as we see below, becomes hugely important in 2011) - sovereign debt, 
the one thing that you didn’t have to worry about in your portfolio - suddenly became a bit 
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of a worry. Consequently, yields became more volatile in early 2009 and spreads began to 
widen. 
 In response in May 2009, the ECB under Trichet decided to cut rates and intervene 
to the tune of 60 billion Euros in the market for what are known as ‘covered bonds’ under 
the guise of a program called ‘credit easing.’ This was a very odd response. The rate cut 
was standard, but why covered bonds? They are a small part of the non-sovereign market, 
and E60 billion was around four percent of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet.9 Much more 
important than the program however, was what Trichet said in the press conference Q and 
A at the time of this announcement. When asked if this program was the ECB’s equivalent 
to the UK and US quantitative easing schemes, he replied, “we are not at all embarking on 
quantitative easing.”10 In saying that the ECB just cocked the gun for the sovereign debt 
crisis that would really kick off less than a year later.  
 To see why what Trichet said was so important you have to think about quantitative 
easing (QE) as a banker would in a moment of distress. Whether or not it’s inflationary or 
money printing or inequality generating through its effect on asset prices is secondary to 
what it does for your bank’s balance sheet. For a banker QE is a Godsend that allows you 
to swap toxic assets for cash, thereby allowing the state to both delever and recapitalize 
your bank without you taking any formal losses. This also allows the state to do bailouts 
without failing the bank or ‘really’ doing any money printing on the proviso that the debt 
generated by the asset swap will eventually swapped back for the cash lent when the 
economy recovers, thus sterilizing the money printing aspect. QE is de facto the 
                                                        
9 Frank Oland Hansen, “Euroland: Credit Easing Versus Quantitative easing” Danske Bank Research Note, 
12th May 2009.  
10 See footnote 1 for reference. 
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sterilization of government debt, which is why Trichet balked at the suggestion that the 
ECB should start doing it. Whether or not the free-lunch/sterilization part of this policy 
works remains an open question, probably not. But the first part had proved tremendously 
successful in triaging the US and UK banking systems and stabilizing their balance sheets. 
 This is why what Trichet said was hugely significant. In saying that QE was not on 
the cards for Europe since the ECB as a transnational central bank had no mandate to back 
national bonds, Trichet just told global financial markets that the ECB did not stand behind 
banking-book asset values, even of AAA sovereign assets, and they would not act as a 
classic lender of last resort. As Eric Lonergan, fund manager and financial author put it, 
this “superficially innocuous decision – to openly reject QE and embark on a trivial 
program of covered bond purchases – may in fact be the precise trigger for the profound 
loss of confidence in peripheral Eurozone government bonds, which accelerated through 
the end of the year and into 2010.”11 I would go further and argue that this was the trigger 
that allowed the development of a slow motion bank run. 
 The timing of events here is very important. After the ECB eschewed QE in May 
2009 and just before the snap Greek election of October 2009 revealed that Greek public 
finances were in a mess (more on this below), the September 2009 German general election 
saw the coalition with the SPD fall and a new CDU-FDP coalition arise that was to take a 
much harder line on austerity going forward. Outgoing SPD Finance Minister Steinbrück 
had declared that Greece would not be allowed to fail. By early 2010 not only that failure 
possibility, it seemed to be an emergent policy. Consequently, as Lonergan argues, a slow 
motion bank run began “in classic fashion…with the weakest link – Greece – in mid-2009, 
                                                        
11 Eric Lonergan, Money, 2nd edition (London: Acumen Publishers 2014) – forthcoming, postscript on 
Eurozone crisis, p. 21.  
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spreading first to Ireland and Portugal, then in increasingly severe waves to Spain, and 
Italy. As in all panics, ultimately the mighty succumb. In November 2011, bond markets 
in all eurozone countries froze and credit spreads widened rapidly on all sovereigns 
including Germany.”12  
The crisis indeed came to Europe, but not from the direction the politicians were 
expecting. That is, while this was most definitely a crisis of sovereign bond markets, it was 
decidedly not caused by the mere existence of those bonds or by excessive spending in the 
states that issued them. It was caused by locally-rational central bank policy by the ECB 
and rather ideological thinking by the German government exacerbating the fears of highly 
levered financial institutions that a rather large solvency problem was heading straight for 
them. When the Eurozone’s biggest creditor, Germany, said in March 2010 that there was 
no bailout provision in the Eurozone, the onrushing headlights just got a bit brighter. But 
how did all this become a crisis of state spending? To answer that, we need to leave 
Brussels and travel to Iqaluit in northern Canada, and then to Toronto.  
 
Finding Bullets in Canada 
 In the spring of 2010, shortly after the Germans inadvertently said ‘go on, short it’ 
to the markets, but with the immediate danger of financial collapse abated and the new 
threat of sovereign contagion yet to fully emerge, a new ideological alignment began to 
take shape. Some of the neoliberal old guard, in both Europe and the United States, began 
to strike back against the Keynesian response.13 Increasingly-on-the-defensive Keynesians 
                                                        
12 Ibid. P. 23 
13 For example, see Alan Greenspan, “Inflation—The Real Threat to Sustained Recovery,” Financial 
Times, June 25, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1fbc4e6-6194-11de-9e03-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1rw5D7xpm.  
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faced off against a coterie of conservatives, neoclassicals, and fellow travelers on the issue 
of surging government debt. Significantly, major German politicians began to join forces 
with the ECB to send a common message. As ECB Chief Jean Claude Trichet put it in a 
much-reported broadside in the Financial Times, “stimulate no more – it is now time for 
all to tighten.”14  
 A week before any full G20 meeting the group’s finance ministers get together to 
lay-out the agenda. By the time of the June 2010 finance ministers meeting in Busan, South 
Korea, the G20 finance ministers now thought that, “recent events highlight the importance 
of sustainable public finances…growth friendly measures, to deliver fiscal 
sustainability.”15 This turn of policy in Busan was made possible by preparatory work done 
at the G7 finance ministers meeting in Iqaluit, in the extreme north of Canada where, as 
Neil Irwin put it, sitting in an igloo eating raw fish from blocks of ice (seriously) “the 
leaders of the world economy collectively agreed that their great challenge had shifted. The 
economy seemed to be healing; it was time for them to turn their attention away from 
boosting growth. No more stimulus.”16 
Coincidentally, days before the G20 meeting, ECB chief Trichet explicitly rejected 
Keynesian demand deficiency arguments citing the need for the reduction of debt. Two 
days later Schäuble published an extended piece in the Financial Times stressing the need 
for “expansionary fiscal consolidation,” stating that Germany will not respond to the crisis 
                                                        
14 Jean-Claude Trichet, “Stimulate No More—It Is Now Time for All To Tighten,” Financial Times, July 
22, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b3ae97e-95c6-11df-b5ad-00144feab49a.html#axzz1rw5D7xpm.  
15 Chris Giles, “G20: All Change on the Fiscal Front,” Financial Times, June 5, 2010, 
http://blogs.ft.com/money-supply/2010/06/05/g20-all-change-on-the-fiscal-front/#axzz22zcCMeF9.  
16 Neil Irwin quoted in Paul Krugman, “How the Case for Austerity Crumbled.” New York Review of 
Books, June 6th 2013. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jun/06/how-case-austerity-has-
crumbled/  
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by “piling up public debt.”17 Given these well-timed flanking maneuvers, by the time the 
G20 meeting took place in Toronto the tide had already turned. The Canadians and the 
British sided with the Germans, leaving the Americans isolated. The final communiqué of 
the Toronto meeting repeated the meme authored by Trichet and amplified by Schäuble of 
“growth friendly fiscal consolidation.” Seen at the time as a fudge between the Keynesian 
and orthodox positions, what it actually signaled was not just the end of global 
Keynesianism, but a recasting of the crisis away from banks and towards sovereigns.  
 
Greece Pulls the Trigger and the Markets ‘Run’ 
 The slow motion bank run that was triggered by Trichet’s remarks in May 2009 
that was galvanized by the change in German politics in September 2009, gained strength 
in October 2009 the incoming Greek government revealed that the reported fiscal deficit 
of 6.5 percent of GDP was in fact closer to 13 percent of GDP. No good deed goes 
unpunished and the low interest rates that Greek debt had enjoyed since joining the Euro 
shot up as investors re-priced Greek bond risk in this more uncertain environment, which 
made a difficult interest payment environment very suddenly awful. Piling on the pressure, 
the ratings agencies downgraded Greek bonds from A to BBB-, which compounded their 
debt burden by lowering prices and spiking yields further. As a result the economy began 
to contract such that outstanding debt increased, GDP collapsed, and insolvency loomed.   
 In such a situation bond market investors face a dilemma. If they believe that Greek 
bonds are going to fall further in value, they should get rid of them as soon as possible.18 
                                                        
17 Wolfgang Schäuble, “Maligned Germany is right to cut spending,” Financial Times, June 24, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9edd8434-7f33-11df-84a3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz22sXtZh8H.  
18 Or buy CDS protection on the bonds, or go short on them to make money on the downside, but 
eventually you want to get out. 
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But if they do they risk everyone else holding these assets doing the same, thereby creating 
a self-defeating contagion fire-sale. This risk of systemic contagion loomed large in late 
2009 when the anticipation of a possible mass dumping of Greek assets because of these 
events led to a further collapse in their price and another spike in their yields. This is why 
the Greek market froze. Not because of over-spending but because of their risk as a 
contagion trigger to other sovereign assets. Given that core Eurozone core banks were 
stuffed full of periphery bonds (how stuffed is revealed below) any such fire sale would 
likely spread to Portugal, Ireland, and, it was feared, maybe even Spain and Italy.  
Given all this, the ideal policy back in late 2009 would have cost around fifty billion 
Euros, less than the covered bond program. It would have required either the ECB to buy 
the secondary market Greek debt that was subject to near-term rollover risk and bury it 
somewhere deep in its balance sheet and walk away, much as the US Fed had done with its 
banks in 2008 with programs such as TALF. So why didn’t they do so?19 The popular 
answer of the time was ‘German politics.’ With a regional election coming up and a new 
more austerity-inclined coalition, it was politically easier to blame the Greeks for being 
lazy than it was to explain to the German public that the ECB needed to bail international 
holders of Greek debt for reasons of systemic risk.  
While plausible, another answer lies in the ECB statutes that forbid one country to 
bail out another for fear of generating moral hazard. These are, except in exceptional 
moments (the treaty in question mentions ‘natural’ disasters) not allowed. The refrain was 
often heard in 2010 and 2011 that the ECB only has one problem to fix, price inflation, and 
                                                        
19 Ironically, the ECB ended up using hedge funds as its hidden toxic balance sheet a year later when it sold 
Greek debt at cents on the dollar to the hedge fund community. Last year (2012/3) one of those funds made 
half a billion dollars on the trade. See http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a11f5be4-4940-11e2-b25b-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2nHuKIbsB  
ACES Cases 2014.1  Blythe, p. 17 
 
one tool to do it with, the rate of interest. As such, the argument goes that the ECB was 
constitutionally unable, while the Germans were politically unwilling, to take 
responsibility. Yet this is not a wholly satisfactory explanation either. The treaty provisions 
in question actually say something quite different from what was often reported.  
Article 127 of the Treat on the Functioning of the European Union says that, “the 
primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability.” Further, it continues that “without prejudice 
to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in 
the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as 
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” So what does article three say? 
It says, inter alia, that “The Union shall…work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability…aiming at full employment and 
social progress, and a high level of protection...It shall promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.” The inclusion of the goals of 
growth, full employment, protection and solidarity, opens the tent to some rather large 
interventionist elephants into the fiscal tent alongside price stability. That the ECB chose 
not to do more given its statutes can be sustained. That it was unable to do more given its 
statutes is simply unsupportable.20  
Hewing to this narrow interpretation of its mandate had severe unintended 
consequences. Far from promoting recovery by instilling confidence in global investors as 
the G20 finance ministers had hoped it would, investors began to price in the risk of 
contagion and the consequences of austerity budgets on growth, and hence future debt 
                                                        
20 I thank Marco Capitão Ferreira of the University of Lisbon Law School for this key insight into the crisis. 
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payments, and the yields on all periphery bonds began to rise dramatically. This is how 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy got lumped together with Greece. The PIIGS-collective 
was born in the fires of contagion risk and a voluntary and misguided contractionary policy.  
With yields spiking to unsustainable levels in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, each 
country received a bailout from the EU, ECB and the IMF as well as bilateral loans on 
condition that they accept and implement austerity packages to right the fiscal ship. Yet 
they wouldn’t have needed these loans or the policy packages (which were the wrong 
medicine anyway) had the ECB chose to stand behind Euro denominated sovereign debt in 
the first place.  
In May 2010 Greece received a 110 billion Euro loan in exchange for a twenty 
percent cut in public sector pay, tax increases, and a ten percent pension cut. The lenders, 
the so-called troika of the ECB, the European Commission, and the IMF, forecast growth 
returning by 2012. Instead, unemployment reached 21 percent in late 2011 while the 
economy continued to contract. In November 2010 Ireland needed a bailout and received 
67.5 Billion Euros for a 26 percent cut in public spending. In March 2011 it was Portugal’s 
turn to received 78 billion Euros in exchange for a similar packet of reforms. However, 
given the contraction in all these economies and persistent fear of contagion, yields on 
Portuguese ten-year debt reached 17 percent in early 2012 while their 10-year bonds were 
downgraded to BBB-, otherwise known as junk.  
Far from being stabilized by the original package of loans and cuts, Greece’s 
financial position continued to deteriorate and required a second bailout in July 2011. 
Another 110 billion Euros of debt, which became 130 billion in October 2011, was added 
to the Greek public sector balance sheet while another 20 percent wage cut was enforced 
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along with similar across-the-board reductions in public spending and more tax increases. 
Eventually, even private sector bondholders had to take a haircut (a loss) on the value of 
Greek debt of around 75 percent, plus write-offs of around 100 billion Euros.21 Just to keep 
things on track, democratically elected governments in Greece and Italy were deposed and 
replaced in November 20112 by unelected technocrats to keep the reforms going in the 
heart of democratic Europe.22  
 
Meanwhile Politicians Play ‘Blame the Victim’ 
 It is once again worth noting the timing of events here. Opposition to Keynesian 
policies intensified in the spring of 2010 just as the Greek crisis really became newsworthy 
and after the Germans had doubled down on the ECB’s backstop error. In the UK, 
Germany, and the United States, politicians in favor of austerity as a good thing in and of 
itself zeroed in on the Greek crisis as a metaphor for the perils of Keynesianism. ‘Becoming 
Greece’ became a scare-story to justify cutting back at home. George Osborne, the new 
Conservative British Chancellor of the Exchequer, made repeated comparisons to the fiscal 
situation of Greece and the UK as soon as he was elected.23 Ex-IMF chief economist Simon 
Johnson argued around the same time that the UK and Greece were essentially similar, 
despite the fact that they manifestly were not.24 The UK has a real central bank armed with 
its own currency, a fact clearly seen in UK bond yields, which barely moved during this 
                                                        
21 Despite these austerity binges, Greek debt is projected (if all things remain equal for the next eight years, 
which will never happen) to reach 120 percent of GDP by 2020. The IMF thinks 145 percent by 2020 is 
more likely.  
22 Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs, “Only Germany can Save the Euro” Foreign Affairs, December 2011. 
23 “You can see in Greece an example of a country that didn’t face up to its problems, and that is the fate 
that I want to avoid” being a typical example. “UK to Dodge Greek Fate with Tough Budget-Osborne,” 
Reuters, June 20, 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/06/20/uk-britain-osborne-budget-
idUKTRE65J0UX20100620.  
24 “UK Economy Faces Crisis,” BBC News, February 7, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8503090.stm.  
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period. Meanwhile, conservative historian Niall Ferguson likened Greece to the United 
States, with collapse just over the horizon just as the debt-obsessed Tea Party rose to 
prominence.25 Consequently, congressional Republicans in the United States leapt upon on 
such comments with glee, while media outlets picked up and amplified the story throughout 
the spring of 2010.26 In Europe, the ECB repeatedly honed in on Greece as the future of all 
European states unless budgets were cut.27  
Austerity’s moment in the sun had arrived courtesy of the Greeks, yet all the Greeks 
ever really did was tell the truth about their budget deficit, and that only mattered because 
the ECB told that markets that Europe had no lender of last resort and the Germans insisted 
on no bailouts. Quite understandably, the markets reacted to the fear of break up risk 
generated by such flawed institutions and locally rational, but collectively disastrous 
policies, not the size of Greek public spending, but that didn’t matter politically. The 
offensive against Keynesianism at a global level was married to the discovery of the Greek 
debt crisis and amplified via the threat of contagion to establish fiscal austerity as only 
‘reasonable’ way forward. So established only with the proviso that this was all a crisis of 
spending, which it never was. But this rebranding exercise nonetheless enabled the greatest 
bait and switch in modern history, which is what brings us back to the banks and why all 
of this is really just a continuation of the banking crisis that began in the US is late 2007. 
 
                                                        
25 Niall Ferguson, “A Greek Crisis Is Coming to America,” Financial Times, February 10, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f90bca10-1679-11df-bf44-00144feab49a.html#axzz1syduMdbA.  
26 Tellingly, googling “US like Greece Spring 2010” gets over 62 million hits. 
27 Peter Wise, “Trichet Calms Fears of Debt Crisis Spread,” Financial Times, May 6, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df61c58e-00f7-11df-a4cb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1syduMdbA; and Ralph 
Atkins, Kerin Hope, and David Oakley, “ECB Warning to Debt-ridden Governments,” Financial Times, 
January 14, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63b15724-5926-11df-adc3-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1syduMdbA.  
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The Greatest Bait-and-Switch in Modern History 
The result of all this opportunistic politicking was to cover up the greatest bait and 
switch operation in modern history where private sector debt generated by highly levered 
financial institutions (HLFI’s) was rechristened as ‘the debt’ generated by ‘out-of-control’ 
public spending. Yet, as demonstrated above, there was no orgy of public spending. It’s a 
myth. The fiscal crisis in all of these countries that was apparent by mid 2010 was the 
consequence of this deeper financial crisis, not its cause. To continue to make the opposite 
case is to quite deliberately confuse cause and effect. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff, no friends of Keynesian policy, note that 80 percent of the time there is a banking 
crisis it is followed by a sovereign debt crisis.28 More strongly, Moritz Schularick and Alan 
Taylor have shown that sovereign debt crises are almost always “credit booms gone bust.”29 
They develop in the private sector and end up in the public sector. The causation is clear. 
Banking bubbles and busts cause sovereign debt crises. Period. So why all of this myth 
making if the reverse is true?  
To really understand why the eurozone has been slashing itself to insolvency in the 
name of solvency we need to acknowledge how the Euro as a currency enabled the 
development of a system of banks that is too big to bail. That is, no sovereign can cover 
the risks generated by their own banks because the banks are too big and the sovereign no 
longer has a printing press.  
In this regard HILFI’s are like nuclear meltdowns waiting to happen. The firm, in 
doing its everyday business, generates externalities that it can never hope to internalize 
                                                        
28 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series 14587 (December 2008). 
29 Moritz Schularik and Alan M. Taylor, “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and 
Financial Crises, 1870-2008,” American Economic Review 102 (2) April 2012 pp. 1029-1062. 
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through normal bankruptcy procedures. In such a world there can be no bail out big enough 
to save the system if it starts to fail, unless the only central bank standing issues a blanket 
guarantee, which in this case it steadfastly refused to do since it was beholden to no 
sovereign. Consequently, when the real extent of the crisis became clear by early 2011, 
politicians knew that the system could not be allowed to fail, but were reduced to 
employing means that made the situation worse rather than better. This is what generates 
the bait and switch at the heart of all this, which is why Europe turned a lending crisis into 
a spending crisis - to save its banks - and it’s still saving them today. 
 
Bad Convergence 
The project of bringing Europe even closer together through a common currency, 
the Euro, was supposed to work on two levels. First, economies that were not well 
integrated, had different business cycles, and had little specialization according to their 
relative economic strengths, would converge simply by using the same unit of account. 
Second, having different currencies meant different exchange rates, which had different 
consequences for states, people, and firms. For people and firms he transactions costs of 
changing currencies reduced both travel and trade. For states, different rates generated 
currency volatility that was hard to hedge. It also created incentives for weaker currencies 
to devalue against their stronger trading partners to improve their competitiveness, which 
many European states did, repeatedly.  
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The problem with devaluation as an adjustment policy is not only that it beggars-
thy-neighbor, it also leads to import inflation in the countries that devalue.30 European 
leaders struggled with these inflation/devaluation/volatility problems building successively 
more elaborate exchange rate arrangements to keep their currencies together. Currency 
arrangements called ‘snakes’ were replaced by ‘snakes in tunnels’ and then by formal 
‘exchange rate mechanisms’ to discipline sovereigns. They all failed. After the ERM failed 
in 1992 after the famous raid on the Bank of England by George Soros, European 
policymakers decided to go all in.  
The Euro, the successor to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, would become 
a one-time internal fix of all the different European currencies in exchange for one external 
floating currency, with one important difference. Rather than pegging and retaining 
national currencies and printing presses, after the fix the national currencies would be 
abolished and the printing presses would be handed over to the ECB to remove inflation 
and devaluation as policy options. Instead, armed with a new independent central bank that 
had, as we saw, many goals but chose to prioritize only one, keeping inflation low, prices 
and wages, it was assumed, would automatically adjust to the external balance. This is a 
hard constraint and many economists predicted that the Euro would fail, just as prior 
arrangements had failed. It didn’t fail, but it did cause problems that remained hidden for 
almost a decade that were liquidated away by an unexpected Tsunami of cheap money. 
Specifically, instead of creating convergence, the introduction of the Euro created a great 
                                                        
30 Italy became the poster child for these problems having devalued the Lira every year between 1980 and 
1987, save 1984, thereby suffering much higher than average inflation than the rest of Europe while 
effectively reducing the average Italian’s real wage through the inflationary back door. 
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divergence between European economies, in almost everything except their bond spreads 
and balance of payments.  
 
Figure One: Eurozone Current Account Imbalances 
 
Notice that before the introduction of the Euro, France was the only country with a 
current account surplus. After its introduction France held on until 2005 before moving 
into deficit. Germany moved into surplus in 2001 and the rest of the Eurozone moved 
further into deficit. There was a convergence of sorts. Everyone except Germany started to 
run deficits. To see why this happened, we need to turn to how such deficits were financed, 
which takes us into the realm of sovereign debt markets, and what the introduction of the 
Euro did to the incentives of European banks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two: Eurozone Ten Year Government Bond Yields 
ACES Cases 2014.1  Blythe, p. 25 
 
 
On the left hand side of figure two we see what the markets used to think of 
sovereign bonds before the Euro was introduced. Greek 10 year bond yields started out at 
nearly 25 percent in 1993, fell to 11 percent in 1996, and then came within 50 basis points 
(half a percent) of German bonds by 2001. Similarly, Italian bonds fell from a high of 13 
percent in 1994 to becoming ‘almost German’ in 2001 in terms of yield. Yet it is manifestly 
obvious that neither Greece nor Italy, nor anyone else, actually became Germany, the 
economic convergence predicted simply didn’t happen. So why then did we see this 
convergence in bond yields?  
The most common answer is because the introduction of the ECB took both foreign 
exchange risk and inflation risk off the table via its determined credibility and narrow 
constitution. This despite the fact that national bonds were still issued by the same national 
governments that now had no printing presses. Given this free-lunch (in terms of risk) 
banks and other financial players could now load up with them, assuming that the risks we 
saw on the left-hand side of figure two had all been removed by admission to the Euro. As 
yields fell but remained positive over Bunds, the periphery was flooded with cheap money, 
swamping local wholesale funding markets, thereby pumping up private sector 
indebtedness.  
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In short, northern lenders lent to southern banks and southern consumers used this 
tsunami of cheap cash to buy northern products, hence the current account imbalances 
noted above. But why did these bond buyers believe that this new and untested institution, 
the ECB, would in fact guard the value of their bonds that national governments didn’t 
matter anymore, and that Greece was now functionally Germany? The answer was, they 
didn’t need to believe anything of the sort, at least until Trichet disabused them of the 
notion in May 2009, because what they were actually doing was the mother of all moral 
hazard trades.   
 
The Mother of all Moral Hazard Trades 
 If you were a European bank back in the late 1990s and you saw sovereign bond 
yields falling, you also saw a source of easy profits was disappearing. Yet if the ECB really 
did get rid of exchange rate and inflation risk then these new Euro denominated bonds 
really were a banker’s dream – a free option – safe assets with a positive upside – albeit 
with lower yields. So you would be a fool not to load up on them, especially before they 
yields fell any further, and load up on them they did thus bloating balance sheets and 
prompting industry consolidation to profit more from economies of scale. Erik Jones 
reports that in 1985 there were 12,526 Euro area credit institutions. By 2006 that number 
had fallen to fewer than 7000. Meanwhile, in 1985 the average ratio of bank assets to GDP 
was 177 percent. By 2006 it was over 300 percent, with some major countries having even 
higher exposures, a point we examine in detail shortly.31  
                                                        
31 Erik Jones, “The Forgotten Financial Union,” in Mattthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth (eds.), The Future of 
the Euro, p. 5-6 – forthcoming in 2014. 
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But as yields converged you would have to buy more and more of these assets to 
make the same amount of money with them. There was however a small but significant 
difference in yield between the bonds of Northern European sovereigns and those of the 
periphery even after the yields converged. So, if you swapped out your low yield German 
and Dutch debt and replaced that with as much PIGS debt as you can find, and then 
turbocharged that by running operating leverage ratios as high as 40:1 – typical in the 
European banking system and higher than those reprobate ‘Anglo-Saxon’ banks mentioned 
above, you would have one heck of an institutionally guaranteed money machine. But what 
makes this a moral hazard trade?  
 Imagine that you knew Greece was still Greece and that Italy was still Italy and that 
the prices quoted in the markets represented the bond buying activities of banks pushing 
down yields making this convergence trade rather than any true estimate of the risk of the 
bond itself. Why would you buy such securities if the yield did not reflect the risk? Well, 
you might realize that if you bought enough of them, if you became really big, and those 
assets were to lose value, you would become a danger to your national banking system, 
and you would have to be bailed out by your sovereign. If you were not bailed out, given 
your exposures, cross-border linkages to other banks and high leverage, you would pose a 
systemic risk to the whole European financial sector. As such, the more risk that you took 
onto your books, especially in the form of periphery sovereign debt, the more likely that 
your risk would be covered by the ECB and your national government, or both, regardless 
of what they said and their official statutes maintained. This would be a moral hazard trade 
on a continental scale. The Euro may have been a political project, and as such a political 
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intervention that provided the economic incentive for such a trade to take place. But it was 
private sector actors that jumped at the opportunity. 
 It was until recently hard to prove that this was in fact guiding the behavior of 
European major banks. After all, admitting this would be, in many jurisdictions, a criminal 
offense. However, the recent Anglo-Irish ‘tapes’ scandal where senior executives of the 
now defunct bank of the same name were caught out discussing how they would lie to the 
government about how indebted they were provides some direct evidence. The plan was to 
bring the government in such that once they had “got skin in the game” they could then 
reveal much bigger debts, dump them on the sovereign - being too big to fail - and then 
walk away.32 This is clear evidence a moral hazard play of exactly the type mooted above, 
so why should it be confined to the single case of Ireland?  
Now either because large banks really believed that the untested ECB had magically 
removed all risk from the system, or because they saw the possibilities of a moral hazard 
trade and acted on them, or both, major European banks took on as much periphery 
sovereign debt (and other periphery assets) as they could. Indeed, these banks were 
incentivized by the European Commission to get their hands on as many of these periphery 
bonds as they could to use them as collateral in repo transactions, thereby upping the 
demand for them still further.33 There was however one slight flaw in the plan. While bank 
lending and borrowing may be cross-border in the eurozone, bank resolution and bailout 
responsibilities (notwithstanding the still languishing proposal for an EU banking union 
                                                        
32 See http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/tapes-that-reveal-what-really-led-to-national-collapse-
29366839.html  
33 Daniela Gabor and Cornel Ban, “Fiscal Policy in (European) Hard Times: Financialization and Varieties 
of Capitalism,” Paper presented at the Understanding Crisis in Europe Workshop, Bristol Business School, 
May 11, 2012. 
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that does little to fundamentally address these problems) are still national.34 So while any 
individual bank could play this moral hazard trade, if they all did it together then what was 
individually ‘too big to fail’ became very quickly to ‘big too bail’ as a whole. Once again, 
what was locally rational was collectively disastrous. 
 
Private Debt – Sovereign Risk 
 To get an idea of the risks involved in this trade for the sovereigns involved recall 
that if you take the combined assets of the top six U.S. banks in the third quarter of 2008 
and add them together it comes to just over 61 percent of U.S. GDP. Any one of these 
banks, on average, could then claim to impact about 10 percent of U.S. GDP if it failed. 
Add the risk of contagion discussed above and you have a ‘too big to fail’ problem. Now 
do the same with European banks in the fourth quarter of 2008 when the crisis was just 
about to really take off.  
In late 2008 the top three French banks had a combined asset footprint of 316 
percent of France’s GDP. The top two German banks had assets equal to 114 percent of 
German GDP. By 2011 at the peak of the crisis and after two years of ECB inactivity those 
figures were still 245 percent and 117 percent respectively. Deutsche Bank alone had an 
asset footprint of over 80 percent of German GDP and ran at an operational leverage level 
                                                        
34 The proposed EU wide banking union of September 2012 seeks to address this problem by making the 
ECB the monitor for all systemically important banks in the Eurozone – some 5000 entities. The main 
problem with the proposal, apart from the fact that the UK will most likely torpedo it, is that supervision 
alone does not solve a problem of solvency. Unless the ECB is willing to become the direct lender of last 
resort to individual banks across the Eurozone, then simply telling a national regulator that a bank with .8 
of GDP is about to blow-up will do nothing to solve the problem if the national regulatory does not have 
the cash to deal with the problem. Bailing indirectly through the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
is limited by the size of the ESM. In short, you can’t credibly commit to providing unlimited liquidity with 
an instrument that is cash limited. By the time of writing this problem has still not been addressed despite 
the ‘single supervisory mechanism’ and ‘the common rulebook’ being agreed in late 2013. 
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of around 40:1 in 2012.35 This means a mere three percent turn against its assets impairs its 
whole balance sheet and potentially imperils the German sovereign. One bank, ING in 
Holland, had an asset footprint that is 211 percent of its sovereign’s GDP in 2011. The top 
four UK banks had a combined asset footprint of 394 percent of UK GDP that same year.  
The respective sovereign debts of these countries of around 80 percent of GDP pale 
into insignificance. Sovereign debt is ultimately and credibly backed by the inter-
generational capacity to tax. Private debt levered off sovereign debt is backed by nothing 
except the central bank.36 So when the central bank says it’s not going to back the system 
and the system is three times the size of the underlying economies and twice as levered as 
the entire US banking system, you have a system where European banks have become too 
big to bail.37  No sovereign, even with its own printing press, can bail out bank with 
exposures of this magnitude.38 So if you have signed up to a currency arrangement where 
you gave yours away, you really are in trouble. As Simon Tilford and Philip Whyte put it 
                                                        
35 Aaron Kirchfeld, Elena Logutenkova, and Nicholas Comfort, “Deutsche Bank No.1 in Europe as 
Leverage Hits Valuation,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
26/deutsche-bank-no-1-in-europe-as-leverage-hits-market-valuation.html.  
36 All figures here are calculated from bank filings in years 2008 and 2011. 
http://media.bnpparibas.com/invest/annual-reports/ra2008en/default.htm http://www.credit-
agricole.com/en/Finance-and-Shareholders/Financial-reporting/Credit-Agricole-S.A.-financial-results/2008 
https://www.db.com/ir/en/content/sec_filings_2008.htm 
https://www.commerzbank.com/en/hauptnavigation/aktionaere/service/archive/unternehmensberichterstattu
ng/2009_8/u_berichte_09_01.html  
http://www.ing.com/Our-Company/Investor-relations/Annual-Reports/Annual-Reports-Archive.htm 
http://group.barclays.com/about-barclays/investor-relations/financial-results-and-publications/annual-
reports  
http://www.investors.rbs.com/report_subsidiary_results  
http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/investors/financial_performance/company_results.asp#2008  
37 All of these figures are author’s calculations culled from Bank annual reports, BIS reports, IMF GFSR 
reports and similar.  
38 Which goes some way to explaining Germany’s hesitancy on banking union proposals and the thorny 
issue of ‘legacy assets’ – aka – bad loans. EU bank assets are just over E45 trillion. EU GDP is around E15 
trillion. German GDP is only E3.5 trillion. They are simply not big enough to flush away the bad assets 
even if they wanted to. See Mark Blyth, “Deutschland schafft das nicht.” Der Speigel, (42) 14th October 
2013, pp. 130-134.  
ACES Cases 2014.1  Blythe, p. 31 
 
bluntly, the Eurozone crisis is “a tale of excess bank leverage and poor risk management 
in the core…[and]…the epic misallocation of capital by excessively leveraged banks.”39  
Right from the start the Euro was a banking crisis waiting to happen. One trigger 
for the crisis was Trichet’s denial of lender of the ECBs lender of last resort function. 
Germany’s insistence on ‘no bailouts’ was another. Greece’s moment of transparency and 
the discovery of the discovery of contagion/break-up risk was another. The political 
responses of the European governing classes who opportunistically turned a banking crisis 
into a public debt crisis at exactly the wrong moment was still another. But the final trigger 
was one that lay deep within the banking system itself. It was one that centered upon the 
use of government bonds as repo collateral for the funding of banks. And once again, what 
is now portrayed as a public sector crisis is in fact, at its core, an almost entirely private 
(banking) sector problem that quietly became a public sector liability. 
 
Collateral Damage – European Style 
 So let’s imagine that you are a big European bank and you have executed a giant 
moral hazard trade against EU sovereigns. To make this work you would need to run very 
high levels of leverage to profit from it. So where would you get the money to run such 
levels? Generally speaking, banks can fund their activities in two ways, through increasing 
deposits and issuing equity on the one hand, and through increasing debt on the other. If 
more equity is issued the value of each share falls, so there is a limit at which equity 
                                                        
39 Simon Tilford and Philip Whyte, “Why Stricter Rules Threaten the Eurozone,” Center for European 
Reform (November 2011): 5-6. As they further note, “the very countries that have insisted on wrenching 
economic adjustments in the debtor countries have often been the ones that have done the most to conceal 
the fragility of their own banks.” Ibid. 8. 
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issuance becomes self-defeating. Raising deposits, especially in an economy where savings 
rates are falling, also has limits. Debt has no such limit.  
So where can European banks find huge amounts of cheap debt to fund themselves? 
The overnight sale and repurchase (repo) markets were one source, where enormous sums 
of money are lent overnight at very low rates of interest against collateral. And where else 
highly levered European banks borrow short term to fund lending 30 years out? The U.S. 
money-market funds that were looking for positive returns in a low interest rate world after 
2008 provided another conduit. After all, those conservative European banks were nowhere 
near as risky as those U.S. banks we were told, so why not buy lots of their short-term debt? 
After all, the ECB will never let them fail – right?  
Unfortunately, appearances can be deceptive. As the 2000s progressed those 
supposedly conservative Europeans banks increasingly switched out of safe, local deposit 
funding and loaded up on as much short-term internationally sourced debt as they could 
find. After all, it was much cheaper than relying on Oma’s savings. So much so that 
according to one study, by “September 2009, the United States hosted the branches of 161 
foreign banks who collectively raised over $1 trillion dollars’ worth of wholesale bank 
funding, of which $645 billion was channeled for use by their headquarters.”40 U.S. banks 
at this time sourced around 50 percent of their funding from deposits, whereas for French 
and British banks the comparable figure was less than 25 percent.41 By June 2011, $755 
billion of the $1.66 trillion dollars in U.S. money market funds was held in the form of 
                                                        
40 Hyun Song Shin, “The Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium,” (paper presented at the Mundell-
Fleming Lecture, 2011 IMF Annual Research Conference, November 10-11, 2011): 17. Available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~hsshin/www/mundell_fleming_lecture.pdf.  
41 Gabor and Ban, “Varieties of Capitalism for all Seasons: Fiscal Policy in the European Crisis.” 
Unpublished Manuscript (Spring 2012): 9 Figure 1. 
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short-term European bank debt, with over $200 billion being issued by French banks 
alone.42  
As well as being funded via short term borrowing on U.S. markets, it turned out 
those risk-averse European banks hadn’t missed the U.S. mortgage crisis after all with the 
asset side of their portfolios. In fact, over 70 percent of the special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
set up to deal in U.S. ‘asset backed commercial paper’ (mortgages) were set up by European 
banks.43 2008 may have been a crisis of U.S. mortgage markets, but it had European funders 
and channels, and most of those devalued assets remain stuck on the balance sheets of 
European banks domiciled in states with no printing presses and that were now worried 
about their sovereign holdings. By early as 2010 then, just as the sovereign debt yields 
began to move apart, the ability of European banks to fund adequately themselves 
evaporated in a manner that was an almost perfect re-run of the United States in 2008.  
Just as had led to the collapse of Bear and Lehman in 2008, when the collateral 
being posted for repo by European banks began to lose value, more collateral had to be 
posted to borrow the same amount of money. While the collateral of choice for U.S. 
borrowers in the U.S. repo markets in 2008 was AAA rated mortgage-backed securities, 
for European borrowers in London in 2010 and 2011 it was AAA rated European sovereign 
debt. Just as U.S. borrowers needed a substitute for T-Bills and turned to AAA mortgage 
bonds so they could lend more and more, so European borrowers had too few nice safe 
German bonds to pledge as collateral, and so they began to pledge the periphery debt that 
they had purchased en masse, which was, after all, rated almost the same, a policy that was 
turbocharged by the European Commission directive mentioned above that “established 
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that the bonds of Eurozone sovereigns would be treated equally in repo transactions,” in 
order to build more liquid European markets. By 2008 PIIGS debt was collateralizing 25 
percent of all European repo transactions. 44 You can begin to see the problem if that 
collateral lost value, which is exactly what happened in 2008 in the US and happened again 
in 2010 and 2011 in Europe.   
 As investors increasingly fretted about European sovereigns, credit ratings agencies 
started to downgrade their bonds, which is their job. But that meant more of the same bonds 
had to be pledged to get the same amount of cash in a repo. Unfortunately, with around 80 
percent of all such repo agreements using European sovereign debt as collateral, when 
those bonds fell in value the ability of European banks to fund themselves and keep their 
highly levered structures going began to evaporate.45  
 Banks that had healthy assets might have been able to withstand this sudden loss of 
funding, but European banks were stuffed full of other rapidly devaluing periphery assets 
thanks to the policy induced recession in the periphery. By early 2010 Eurozone banks had 
a collective exposure to Spain of $727 billion, $402 billion to Ireland, and $206 billion to 
Greece.46 French and German bank exposures to the PIGS were estimated in 2010 to be 
nearly one trillion dollars. French banks alone had some $493 billion in exposures to the 
PIGS, which was equivalent to 20 percent of French GDP. Standard and Poors estimated 
French exposures to be as high as 30 percent of GDP, all told.  
Again, the vast majority of these exposures were private sector exposures while the 
sovereign component of these figures was comparatively small. But what mattered was 
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how levered these banks were and how important those sovereign bonds were for funding 
these banks. Once these bonds lost value, European banks were effectively shut out of U.S. 
wholesale funding markets and a general bank-run was just around the corner. Meanwhile, 
sovereign yields were going up and up regardless of how much sovereigns cut since the 
problems the faced lay in the banking sectors’ use of sovereign debt for funding, and not 
at all in the fiscal stance of the governments in question.  
 
Doing “Whatever it Takes” (Whatever the Cost) 
What stopped that bank run was a change at the top of the ECB from Jean Claude 
Trichet to Mario Draghi. Trichet saw what was going on and launched the Long Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) of the ECB in late 2011 where a trillion Euros of cheap 
funding at one percent for three years flooded Euro banking circuits to replace the funds 
from the short-term money markets. This unorthodox policy of quasi-quantitative easing 
offered effective but temporary respite. Yet within two months of the first LTRO sovereign 
bond yields were rising again, and the banks those sovereigns were responsible for now 
had even more sovereign debt on their balance sheets since they used the money to buy 
distressed bonds and pocket the spread. That doing so also brought down yields and 
allowed periphery banks to clean up their non-performing loans one book at a time was 
part of the strategy.47  
In early 2012 Draghi decided to do it again, just to make sure, with LTRO2, which 
was another half a trillion in funding, and he followed this up in the fall of 2012 with an 
expansion of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance Program (ELA), which added another 
                                                        
47 One might call this a policy of ‘borrow at one percent, buy at ten percent, use the spread to bury the dead, 
and cash it in a four percent.’ This is in essence the ECB’s stealth QE/ bank resolution mechanism.  
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half a trillion in liquidity, to periphery banks in particular. He then made his famous 
promise in 26th July 2012 to “do whatever it takes to save the Euro.”48 Yields fell and stayed 
down on Draghi’s promise. The crisis of the bond markets was over, for now. 
Draghi did what Trichet could not bring himself to do. Not because of any 
newfound love for the other goals written into articles 127 and 3 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. He did it because the entire European banking system 
was about to go the way of Lehman Brothers and there was quite simply no way that was 
going to be allowed. Too many assets and incomes, as well as investments in bank equity 
and debt, were at stake. But how could the ECB, and the different European governments 
involved, justify what is essentially a bailout of the assets and incomes of the top end of 
the European income distribution by the bottom end? They could do so because by the time 
all this occurred the entire crisis had already been reduced to and narrated nothing more 
than a sovereign debt crisis caused by too much overspending that had to be met by firm 
budgetary austerity. That, after all, was the hymn sheet that emerged from Toronto, which 
now provided cover for the greatest bait and switch in modern history.  
It was the greatest bait and switch in modern history because the private debts of 
the European banking sector became the public debts of European sovereigns smaller than 
the banks they bailed. They did this the hard way, through off the books liquidity assistance, 
bailouts, loans, a policy-induced recession, a collapse in taxes and GDP, and a commitment 
to austerity that has resulted in more debt, not less. The irony, of course, being that if this 
really was a sovereign debt crisis bond yields and debt loads would move in the same 
direction. That they move in opposite directions, debt goes up and yields go down, right 
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across the Eurozone once Draghi intervened, shows perhaps most clearly that this was a 
crisis of central banks and central bank policy and not a crisis of budgets.49 But someone 
has to pay for that all that debt and it’s not going to be those that benefitted from the 
bailouts, so budgets must be slashed, not to restore confidence or reduce yields as 
apologists would have it, but to pay for the largest class specific put option ever 
constructed.  
And just how much is that going to cost? Putting aside the cost of austerity policies 
in terms of lost GDP and unemployment, and focusing only the costs of bailing the banks, 
Oliver Wyman’s latest report on European banking estimates those costs as follows. Of the 
E700 billion that European banks have raised since 2007, “E350 billion has come from the 
public sector…In fact, total state support approved for the EU financial sector totals more 
than E5 trillion, equivalent to 40 percent of [eurozone] GDP.”50 Of capital injected into 
banks to keep them afloat, “only about 10 percent of the original capital injected has been 
repaid.”51 Returns on equity have collapsed to around 4 percent while cost bases have risen, 
all of which implies without official support these banks would be bankrupt. Again, as 
Oliver Wyman put it bluntly, “otherwise insolvent banks have been recapitalized and the 
monetary policies of the ECB and national central banks have allowed themselves at low 
cost.”52 
                                                        
49 It was as Paul DeGrauwe and Yuemei Ji showed in a manner that supports this thesis, it was also a crisis 
of mutually reinforcing panics between markets and policymakers that had almost nothing to do with 
underlying budgetary positions save the initial position of the spread. See Paul DeGrauwe and Yuemei Ji , 
“From Panic Driven Austerity to Symmetric Macroeconomic Policies in the Eurozone,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 51, 2013. 
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 Given the costs involved of both the bailouts and the recessionary policies that 
accompany them, why then do European governments cash in this class specific put option 
and blame it all on sovereigns who have spent too much? Basically, it’s because you could 
hardly come clean about all this in a democracy and expect to survive. Imagine, just for a 
moment, if a major European politician tried to actually explain what’s going on, why a 
quarter of Spain needs to be unemployed, and why the whole of periphery Europe needs to 
sit in a quasi-permanent recession - just to save a piece of paper that has only existed for a 
decade - and of course the assets of the top end of the income distribution.  
When a banking system becomes too big to bail by any one state but its bailed out 
nonetheless, the moral hazard trade that started it all becomes systemic ‘immoral hazard’ - 
an extortion racket begun by banks but aided and abetted by the very politicians elected to 
serve our interests.53 When that trade takes place in a set of institutions that is incapable of 
resolving the crisis it faces, the result is a politics of perma-austerity, low growth and much 
diminished expectations, which is where Europe finds itself today.  
 
Conclusion 
 Resolving this crisis is in principle quite easy since what begins with the banks must 
end with the banks. First, stop doing austerity. The fact that yields and debt loads are 
negatively correlated with an r2 of .96 shows that the size of the deficit is not driving the 
cost of borrowing.54 So long as central bank policy on liquidity is deemed credible, then 
                                                        
53 This brings to mind a perversion of Charles Tilly’s classic description of the state as a protection racket 
where states provided protection from their own predations in exchange for revenue. Now we live in world 
where politicians (usually unelected) protect banks that run too big to fail/bail extortions rackets against 
global taxpayers. I thank Matthias Matthijs for this insight.  
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ACES Cases 2014.1  Blythe, p. 39 
 
there is room to grow. Portugal and France grew in Q2 2013 because they missed their 
deficit targets. The automatic stabilizers kicked in and GDP recovered. The next quarter 
they tightened and growth disappeared. The latest growth figures of Q 2013, once one 
factors out Germany and similar missed targets (France) is basically flat. This is not a 
recovery, despite the spin. However, in such a context restoring growth does not require a 
massive Keynesian stimulus. Simply not self-harming, Hippocrates rather than Keynes, 
would be a major start.  
Second, policymakers need to get the stalled banking union, the institutional reform 
at the core of all this, sorted beyond the common rulebook and the single supervisory 
mechanism. German prevarications notwithstanding, today’s legacy assets – mainly the 
bad loans stuck in the Spanish and related banking sectors - need to either be asset swapped 
out or recorded as losses. To avoid the systemic implosion this would incur, which is why 
policymakers are hesitant to make progress here, some form to debt mutualization, ECB 
special purpose financing vehicle, or extension of the European Stability Mechanism is 
needed. City of London internal estimates place “the mismarking of European banks’ 
“pretend and extend” on non-performing loans (NPLs) as somewhere between 1.5-2 trillion 
Euros.”55 As bond dealer Bill Blain put it, in its current form, “the Euro 60 billion in the 
ESM [is] about enough to cover the first 20 seconds of the next European financial crisis 
when the NPLs are in the region of 1.5 trillion.”56 Policymakers must face up to this 
challenge in order to get Europe out of perma-austerity or risk another crisis.  
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 Third, and perhaps most importantly, Europe is not a single economy. It is 
constituted by different varieties of capitalism that work on orthogonal principles.57 The 
current path of recovery via structural reform and new treaty commitments ignores this 
fact, trying to make very different sets of national institutional complementarities into one 
set of complimentary trans-national institutions. We must realize that such an effort cannot 
work. Economies are historically specific complexes of institutions and ideas. The current 
attempt to turn the whole of Europe into a net exporter in the German image cannot work 
once one recognizes this. Just as allowing one set of banking institutions to cover the 
continent ended badly, we risk doing the same now with a flawed one-size fits all fiscal 
reform agenda. Given how much damage these institutions have already suffered through 
this crisis, the least we can do is to begin to acknowledge this fact and to admit, that 
underneath it all, this is a lending, and not a spending crisis. 
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